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STATE '1rIT 01 TTP CASE.
This was an application for the discha-'je ,i' P:vid
Neagle,a Deputy United Stales 1"Parshal'
?he facts of th,-e case r-iay .),? dividel into tvo stajes,
the first as follows:-
On the third of' Septer-bqr,I8S8,certain ca3es were
tending in fhe Circuit CoLu-t of the Northern District of
California,b-tween Frederick \V.Sharon,as executor,against
David-1 B.Terry and Sarah Althea Terry,his wife,and between
Francis G.Newlands ,as trustee,and others,at'ainst ti e same
partieson demurrers to bills to revive,and carry into
execution,the final decree of the C(urt,in tlie suit of'
William Sharon v. Sarah Althea Hill,and were decided on
that day. That suit was brought to have an alleze: i
marria,,e contract between the parties adjudged a forgey,
and obtain its surrender and cancellation. The decree
rendered adjudg'ed the alleged ma-rriage contract to be a
forgery,an:1 o--deredi it to be surrenderef an canceled.
In deiding the cases,the Court gave an elaborate
opinion upon the questions gnvolvedand whilst it was being
read,ce-tain disorde-l proceeding s took place,for which
the defendantsDavid S.Terry andG his wife,were adjudged
guilty of contempt and ordered to be imprisoned. See in *,i
Terry,36 Fed. Repr.4I.
/
The second stage of tiLe casu began upon the! release,
.Afwho 'mdde various theats of personal violence to Justice
Field and the Circuit Judge. iThese threats were ,at 1they
would t.ke the lives of bot! jud!,es; those a.-aiist Justice
Fie]X1 were sometimes that they wouldl take his life i.rectly;
at other tiies that they would su;bject him to great personal
indignities and humiliations,ani. if hie resented it they
would, kill him.
In consequence of this general belief and expectation,
and the fact that the Attorney-General of the United States
had jiven instructions to the Marshal to see that 1,.e
person of justice Field and of the Circuit Jude,should
be protected from violence,the Marshal of he Northern
District appointed +he petitioner in this case ,DaviU? Neagle,
to accompan' MTr. Justice Field while en,'aLed --i the per-
formance of his duties and while passing from one district
to another within his circuit,so, as to uma-d him asjainst
the threatened attachs.
On the 8th, of Aujust ,I88 ,Justice Field left PanFran-
cisco fo- Los AnJeles,in order to heal', a habeas corpus
casewhich was returnable before him at that city n h
0th -f Auju-ast,and also to be present at the opening of
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the Court on the Ith. ReturninC,he took the train
on Tucsday,th Tith,at I: 0C o'clock in the afternoon,
for San Francisco,where he was expected] to hear a case
then awaiting his a-rival,inmediately upon his L'-+u' n,
bcng accompanic-a b- Deputy V"arshal Neagle. On the morn-
in~j of the I4th,between the hou-s of seven and ei,.ht,the
train arrived at Lathrop,in San Joaquin County, 'rhich is
in the Northern District of California,a staticn Lt which
the trin stopped for breakfast. Freld and the Deputy
Marshal Lt once entereed the .inin; - room,there to take
their breakfastand took their seats at the third taole in
the middle ro! of tables. Justice FielIl seated himself
at the extreme end,on the side lookinj towarft the .oor.
The Deputy y:arshal took the next seat on the left of the
Justice. What subsequently occired is thus stated in
the testimony of Justice Field:-
"A few minutes afterward Judge Terry and his wife
entered. When Irs. Terry saw me, '1ich she did directly
she got diagonally opposite me,she wheeled around suddenly
and rent out in ,reat haste. I aftcrwards understoo:-,
as you heard here,that she went a.fter her satchel. Judge
Terry walker past,opposite to me,and took his seat at the
second tab e below. The only remark I made to Mr.
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Neagle was, 'There is Judge Terry and his wife. He
remarked, 'I see him.' Not another -,w.(rd was said. I
comenced eating' my breaktast. I saw _-Lde Tevy tae
his seat. In a moment or two afterwards,I looked around
and saw Judge Terry leave his seat. I supposed at the time
he was go'n; out to meet his wife,as she had not returned,
so I went on with my breakfast. It seems ,however,that
he came round back of me--I did not see him--and he struck
me a violent blow in the face,followed instantaneo:isl- by
another blow. Coiining so immediately together,the two
blows se-med like one assault. I heard,'Stop Stop'
cried by Neagle. Of cou-'se I was for a moment dazed by
the blows. I turned my heard round and I saw tiat great
form of Terry's, rith his ri.,;ht arm raised' and his fist
clenched to strike me. I felt that L terrific blow was
coming,and his a-m was descen:ing in a curved way,as thcuJa
to strike the side o,' ry temple,when I heard Neagle cry out,
'Stop 'Stop. n an officer.' Instantly t':o shots followed
I can only explain the second sho, from the ,'act that he
did not fall instantly. I did not get up from my
seat,although it is proper for me to say that a friend
of mine thinks I did;but I did not. I looked around and
saw Terry on the floor. I looked at him and saw that
Vpeculial" movement of the eyes that indicates the presence
of death. Of course it "itu a .,rcat shock to me. It is
impossible fol" any one to see a man in the full vicr of
life,.ith all thso faculties that constitute lifeinstant-
ly extinLiished,withut bei-n effected,and I was. I looked
at him fo,- a morment ,then rose fn-om my seat, ,'ent around
and looked at him again and passed on. Great excitement
followed. I must say here that,dreadful as it is to
take life,it was only a questior of seconds whethe- my
life o -. Judge Ter-y's life should be taken. I am firmly
convinced that had the Marshal dela,,e,! two seconds both
he and myself would have be r) the victims of" Terry."
Mr. Neagle in his testimony stated that,before the
train arrived at Fresno,he _-ot up and went out on the plat-
form,leavin the train, and there saw Terry and his wife
gt on the cars; that when the train arrived at Merced,
he spoke to the ccnductor,Woodward,and informed him that
he was a Deputy United States Marshal; that Judge Field
was on the train,and also Terry and his wife,and that he
was apprehensive that when the train arrived at Lathrop,
there would be trouble between those parties,and inquired
whether there was any officer t that Station,and was in-
formed in reply that there was a constable there;that he
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then baquested the conductor to send word to the officer
to be at Lathrop on the arrival of the train,and that he
also applied to other parties to induce them to endeavor
to secure assistance for him at that place in caje it
should be needed.
The Oacts thus stated in the testion> of Justice
Field and the petitioner,were corroberated by the testimony
of all the witnesses to the t ransaction. The petiticncr
soon afterwards accompanied Justice Field to the car,and
whilst in the car,he was a'restld by a constable ,and at
the station below Lathrop he was taken by that office- from
the car to Steckton,the county seat of San Joaquin Coanty,
there he was lodged in the County jail. Mr. Justice
Fiedd was obliged to journey on t. San Francisco without
tlie)otection c f an officer. On the evening of that da',
Mrs. Terry,who did not see the transaction,but was at the
time outside of the dining rooin,made an affiLavit that the
killin;- of Terry was Yurdcr, Jnd charged Justice Field and
Deputy Marshal Neagle with 'the comission of the crime.
Upon this affidavit,a warrant was issued by a Justice of
the Peace at Stockton agairst Nea ;le a-id also against
Justice Field. Subsequently,after the arrest of Justice
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Field,and after his being relec-sed by the United States
I
Circuit Court on TTabeas Corpus upon his own reco :nixance,the
proceeding against him before the Justice of' the Peace was
dismissed,the Governor of the State having written a letter
to the Attorney-General of the state,declaring thet the
proceedingr lf persisted in,would be a brning disgrace to
the state ,and the Attorney-CGoneral havinj advised the
District Attorney of -an Joaquin County to dismiss it.
Therewas no other testimony whatever before the Justice of
the Peace,except the affidavit of Sarah Althea Terry,
upon which it was issue( .
The petition was accordingly Iresented on behalf of
Neagle,to the Ci-cuit Court of the United States for a
writ of habeas corpus in this case,alleging,arnon other
things,that he was arrested and confined in prison fer an
act done by him in the perfo-mance of his duty,namely the
protection of Nr Justice Field,and taken away fr'cm the
further protection,which he was orzjered to give him. The
','it was issued,and upon its return,the Sheriff of San
Joaquin County produced a copy of the warrant issued by
the Justice of the Peace of that county,and of' the affi-
davit of Sarah Althea Terry,upon :,hich it was issued.
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A traverse to that return was I ,en filed in this case,
present ing various grounds why the petitioner should not
be held,the most important of' wh ch ',,ere:-
That an officer of' the United States specially
charjed with1 a particular duty;that of protectin one of
the justices of the Supr-eme Coitrt of the United States,
'hilst engaged in the performance of his duty,could not,
for an act constituting the very performance of' that duty,
be taken from the further performance of his duty cnd
imprisoned by the state authorities,and ---
That.when an officer of' th'e United States,in the dis-
charge ofl his '[uties,is charged with an offence consisting
in the performance of those duties,and is sought to be
arrested,and taken from the fu,'ther performance of them,he
can be brotj1ht before the tribunals of the nation of which
he is an office-,and the fact then inquired into.
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THE MATTER OF DAVID NEAGIT.
Great cases have been important landmarks in the
history of jurisprudence. Iaws have regulated the
principles of justice and noted cases construin, these laws,
have stereot1ped those principles on the xiinds of men.
It has not been a matter of small importance for jurists in
all ages to pass upon the questionginvolved in important
casesand to apply the results of their investicgations in
ftiture discussions. Therefore it will perhaps not be
amiss to consider a few of the r-iore portant questions
involved in the case of I-n Re Neagle ( . Court Am. Law
Reg.,585; 39 Fedr. Rep.,833)as few cases have attracted
public attentionthan this one,coverin, as it does so
many practical as well as universal and 7Tational questions,
-,hich are well worth a careful invest igat ion.
The first point that demiands our attention is: was the
killing of Terry by Neagle exc sable,and,if excusable was
it also _justifiable? This will compel us to discuss
and point out the general principles of homicide applicable
to this case. At comon law horqicide was either excusabl,
justifiable,or felonious. Excusaole homicide included
-2-
among its features the killii, of a person ;ene ;y one in
defence of himself or of another. This rijit of self
defence originated in necessity,but was not the o-itgrowth
of it. Stanley v- Comm.,6 S.W. (Ky),155. This
doctrine oi' self defence extends to the right which one
person has to protect the life cif another when he has a
bona fide belief that the other's life is .n-dangereby tnr
aadIv !ssa,-t cf a third person,and can ely be protected
by taking the life of the assailant. Mr. Bishop in
speaking of the right to assist others in the defence of
person and property,says: "The doctrine here is that what-
ever one may do for himself he may do for another; - - -
and,on the whole though distinctions have been taken and
dr b+s oxiressed,the better view Ilainly is that one may
do for another whatever the other may do for himself."
I Bish. Cr. L.,Sec. 877. A person can only act in
defence of himself or another Then the attack is made
suddenly,wVhen there is reasonable ground to beL eve
that the assault will terminate in the death 6f the person
attacked,and when he has no apparent means of escape.
Whart. L. of' Hom.,36;U.S. v. Kane,34 Fedr. 302. Surely,
the facts in this case bring it wilhin the category of the
law of excusable homicide. Even thoavh Nea l !-s acting
as a private person, ,newertheless,he was acting in the
defence of Justice Field,who having no means of protecting
his person was driven to the "wall" of the law,th-at is the
tablec,by the brutal and deteriined assault of Terry ; nd
who can say,that Deputy Marshall Neagle acted a moment
too soon. For it was only a quest ion of a moment,
whether he shoul I take the life of the assailant or allow
justice Field and perhaps himself to fall a victim to his
deadly assault.
Having determined that the killing of Terry was
excusable ,if Neagle was acting as a private citizen,and
that any person killing Terrythus preserving the life of
Justice Field,could not be punished fer the act;we must
now push our investigations further and determine whether
the act of Ileagle was justifiable as well as excusable
homicide. Justifiable homicide at common law covered
that which was committed in the advancement of public
justice an," under this class fall all cases of homicide
committed by efficers in the larful pursuit of their duty,
after due notice has been given to the offender to desist
from his unlawful acts. Davis v. State,4 S.E.,318.
Then,if Neagle was acting in his officieal capacity as
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a deputy marshal,within his jurisdiction,and without any
unreasonable haste ,the Killing of Terry was a justifiable
act, and Neagle was undoubtedly amenable tro the courts of
the United States as an officer of those courts,
It,therefore,oecomes necessary for us to determine,
whether )he homicide-now in question was connitted by
Neagle hile acting in his official sapacity,and while in
discharge of the duty imposed upon him by the constitution
and laws of the United States; for if he was not then so
acting,the act was comnited without jurisdiction and. he was
alone amenable to the state Courts for tne consequences of
that act. This brings us to the principal point in the
discussion which is,how far does the jurisdiction of the
Officers of the United States Courts extend,and what are
the duties of those officA?
It has been urged by the strict constructionists of
the federal constitiition,that there is no statute or jyro-
vision in that constitution ,-ihich gives to the Mnarthal3and
their deputies the right to protect a federal judge,1"/ ,
not within the structure prcvided for holding a session of
the United States Court,and while he is travelling from one
place of holding court to another in his circuit. F or
they argue that the states have through their courts and
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officers,the absolute c(ntrol of" the territory of the
United States that lies , iithin their bcundaries,except -;,)ere
jurisdiction has been conferred by the states on the
Nation by the constitution and laws as pursuant thereto.
By the constitution, Art. Ist. (Sec. 8) ConGress was
Jiven exclusive authority to legislate in all cases arising
in the dIistrict of Columbia and over all places purchased
for the erectien of Courts,arsenals,r.a&gazines,d ck-yards,
and other needful buildings. But it was never intended
b'Y those illustrious patriots and statesmen who framed the
great bulwark of American Liberty,that our national judi-
ciray should be confined in its sphere of action to a small
portion of the territory which it was designed to govern
and protect. While it can be claimed that the authority
of the United States Officers to execute their duties oii
every foot of American soil,is not given by any express grant
of the states and the Constitution; nevertheless,subsequent
acts of Congress passed pursuant thereto and sustained by
the highest tribunals in our land,have prescribed duties
and conferred authority upon such courts and officials,and
these laws have carried with them all powers essential to
execute those dlities and carry out that authority. The
Statutes have provided that, "It shall be the duty of the
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marshall of each district t( attend the district and cir
cuit courts when sittin,; therein,and to execute,throughout
the district all lawful precepts directed to him,and issued
under the authority of the United States." (U.S.R.S.,
Sec. 787);that,"the mal1shalls and their deputies shall have,
in each state,the sau7e powers,in executing the laws of the
United states as the Sheriffs and their deputies in such
states may have,by law in executing the laws thereof."
(U.S.R.S., Sec.788.) ; and it is further provided that,
"every marshall may appoint one or more leputies. "
U.S.R.S. ,Sec.,780).
These statutes certainly constituted Neagle a peace
.bfficer,for inasmuch as the statutes provide that he shall
have like powers with the sheriffs in the states who act
as peace officers in those states,and was therefo -e bound
to keep the peace of the United States when it was broken
by the violent attack on Mr. Justice Field. That under
such circumstances or similar ones,there i3 such a thing as
the "peace"of the United States;and that the marshall or his
deputies are the proper officers of the jovernment to sus-
tain it,seems to have been definitely settled in Siebold's
case (100, U.S.,371),where certain judges of election were
arrested by United States marshalls for a violation of
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certain p-ovisions of the revis3d statutes of the
United States, (Sees 5515,5522) relating to the manner of
conducting elections. It was claime' that the rarshalls
acted' without jurisdiction; but the right of the marshalls
to keep the "peace" of the United States was clearly
sustained in the following terms: "We hold it to be an
uncontrovertible principle that the government of the United
States may,by means of physical forceexercised through
its official agents,execute on every foot of American soil
the powers and functions that belong to it. This necessari
ly involves the power to commanrff obedience to its laws,
and hence th power to keep the peace to that extent;
|Ib. 394) and though Justice Field dissented,he was
careful to say: "It was the purpose of the framers of the
Constitution to create a government which could enforce its
own laws,ti s own officers an, ribunals,without reliance
upon those of the states,and thus avoid the principal
defect of the government of the confederation,and they
fhill-y accomplished their purpose." (Ii., 413)
But from whence Jo the marshalls and deputy-nmrshalls
receive their authority to execute the laws of the United
States,and the decrees of its courts? What department of
the goverrnent has the pover to constitute marshalls and
deputy mavshalls as the lawfutl officers of the ;c vornmen+
to preserve,protect and defend its ccnstitution laws,ani
treaties. Surely not the Judiciary department, for it
would be contrary to the principles of a republicn &overn-
ment to confer on that body which interprets the laws,power
of executih: them. Surely not the Legislative Department
who make those lawis and who would thus have to pass an
act providing for a person to execite them in each separate
case ,and would thus have the power of detirmining whether its
laws should be executed or not. But the duty of appoint-
ing these offic ials must fall within the executive depart-
ment of the nation,for it is the power and duty of the
president "to take care that the lawjs are faithfully
executed." (Const. Art II.I; and can it be denied that
he has authority to execute those laws throughout the length
and brealth of the nation through the perscn of his offi-
cers. This was in fact all that was being done by
Neajle While p-otectinL Justice Field on his journey from
Los Angeles to Sanfrancisco; and while he was in fact
carrying out the laws of the United States in ,Coing to and
frc between places for holding tribunals,to determine
causes arisinr under the constitution and laws of the United
States,just as much as when he sat upon the benck and passed
u1 on that constitution and th(se iaws. ior how can tiere
be any s curity 4 the constitutional ,'i'hts of' zny per on
from a nalti(fl2] tribunal if the ju IiPs who are to hold that
tribuitl are liable to be subjected to the mob law of a
c(Lntry,:-Ln are bound to --Ily for their protection upon the
scanty means of thiie executive authurity of the sta+,es to
protect them. Clearly it is the duty of the executive
department o! the nation to p-otect the judicial department,
and thus to poriote justice andl carry out the grand prin-
ciples of the "ovrnnent confided to it by the constitution.
Therefore,it must have the riht to execute its decrees on
every spot of Ajri-rican soil by means of Federa O"fficors
and Federal Judges ,and it nust have the right to protect
thm *while in the lawful service o: the United CStates
(Tenn. vs. Davis,O0 U.S.,257) 7hile it mast exec te those
Jecrees as far as possible without intirlerence uith the
sovereiJ)ty of the state,yet Tien they cone in conflict
the lew of th UJnited States must be.supreme;and in the
lanjuao of Chief- ustice Marshall in 1.cCullo, v. T..y-
land ( 'Vheat,316); "The .v mia of the United States,
then,thi_gh limited in it's powers,is supreme,and its laws,
made in pursuance of the cc nstituti.- i,form the supreme law
of the land 'anything, in the co-istitution or laws of any
ai,&te cO the cntrary notwithsta-ndi: . -' ". (li. sec. 40.)
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It may be said,however, in this case that Marshall Neagle
was not appointed by the President to execute the laws of T.he
United States;but that he was appointed oy the marshal of
the Northern District of California,acting under the orders
of the Attorney-General. He did not receive the express
sanction of his appointment from the 1resident;and,there-
fore,was not lawfully constituted to act as a Jeputy marshall.
Nevertheless ,trne acts of congress have provided for a depart-
ment of jus tice with an Attorney-General at its head with
powers to control the marshalls and deputy marshalls in
their several districts. The specification of the powers
must be under the control of the preident and can be
executed by the Attorney-General as his agjent in his direction
to the marshall under thzt section of the Revised Statutes
which enacts that,,"The head of each department (of the
executive)is authorized t6 prescribe regulations not in-
consistent wlth the laws,for the government of his department
and the conluct of its officers." (U.S.R.S,I6I)
All rules and regulations established in accordance with
this section have the force of law and the court takes ju-
dicial notice of them. Long v. Hanson,72 11..,104;
Gratiot v- U.S ,4 How.,80;Ex parts Reed,Ioo U.S.,Ili; U.S.
v. Barrows,I Abb (U.S.),35I. That the President has
-II-
the 'ight to delegate his authoritythere can be no doubt,
for the heads of the various executive departments are bLt
the a, ents of the President,rhen they a-e actinc-, in their
official apacity; and it has been h 1 many times in the
Supreme Court of the United States that the acts of the
head of an executive department are but those of the
fresident. Runkle v. U.S.,122 U.S. 543; 1Vilcox v.
Jackson,13 Pet. 498,5IS; U.S. v. Eliason , 16 Pet 291,302;
Confiscation cases 20 Wall,92,I09; U.S. v. Fa-den,99 U.S.
10,19; Wolsey v. Chaprman,IOI U.S.,755,769.
The authority of the Attorney-General to appoint mar-
shalls and deputies to execute the laws of the nation having
beensustained;we must now determine what protection is
afforded to federal officers in aarrying out the provisions
of the constitution and laws of the United States;
and,,here in, of the power of the national courts to inuire by
W _ito~tY Habeas Corpus into the Ietention of anyrisoner
and to discharge him from cust'ody if he is held in violation
of the constitution,laws ,and statutes.
The ri&"ht of any person to have a restraint of' his
liberty inquire into,was a fundamenta principle of the
common law of England from the earliest times, and became
statute law [,, Magna Charta in the famous words: "We will
SI 13-
sell to no man,we will not deny to any man,either justice
or rih t." Creasy's Eng. Const. Hist.,135,Note.
Howeve owin, tc the constant aversion of this rijhit
during the rei,,ns prior to that of Charles II,this principle
was reenacted and a more speedy method of securing that
riht of lioerty was providled for and riado final in the
famous Habeas Corpus Act (31 Char- II Chapt II.),by
which this right was reduced to the standard of law and
liberty II. Story on the Const.,Sec. 1341),'hiS'tatute
has novw been incorporated into most , f not all,of the state
constitutions,and into the National Constitution in the
following terms: "The privilege of the writ or' Habeas Cor-
_us shall not be suspenzIed,unless when,in case of rebellion
or invasion,the public safety may require it." (Const.
Art Ist. Sec. 9 , Sub. II.)
No reference was made to the grantin. of this writ in thet
section of the Constitution which conferred juisdiction upc',n
the Judicial Department in the following terms: "The Ju-
dicial power of the United StI.tes shall be vested in one
Supreme Court,and in such inferior courts as congress may
from tine to time,ordain and e stablish." (Corist. Art *,
Sec. I) ; or by the next section whic, granted, that,
"The judicial power shall extend to all cases of law c),
-17-
equity ,rising un-der the censtitution,the laws of th' United
States -n, treatise made oy- %hich shall be made Linder their
authority." (Const,Art. .I Sec. II) . Yet from these
simple provisions of ou-, national constitution arid the acts
of c(fnlress passed pursuant the'eto,has been spelled out
by the Supreme Court a right to grant to officers held in
custody by state courts,in violation of the constitution
and laws or' the United States, a w-it of Habeas Corpus
to inquire into the cause of t h irecoriscon and to cis-
charge them if improperly vonfined* We must understanu1 at
the outset that these acts are nct to be const-ued as dimin-
ishing the corrmnon law ju-isdiction of the cou-ts, to issue
the writ; but they are rather to be regarded as extending
their jurisdiction in granting that writ,in increasing
thre number of officers who are entitled to it; an in
guaranteeing- the most speedy inquiry into t-ic cause of commit-
ment and lischarge therefrom,i f hell in violation of the
constitution arn, laws of the United States. (2, Cent.
IL.J.,I87). While we must resort to -'T itten law fcr tho
authority to issue this writ ,yet we may undoubtedly look to
the comon law fo- the determination of the meaning of the term
Habes Corpus. Ex Parte 3ollman ,4 Cranch,(8 U.S. 7.J.
The provisions of the constitution having left the
-14:-
right of the National Tribanals to issue the writ of Habeas
Corpu; in such an imperfect state; the first congress
which met after its adoption,feeling the necessity of the
security of that right,passed the famous judiciary act of
I78C,which p-ovided that, "Either of tie Justices o the
Supreme Couat, as well as judges of the distict cou-ts,
shall have power to grant !rrits of habeas corpas,for the
purpose of inquiry into the cause of commitment: provided,
that writs of Habeas Corpus shall in no case extend
to p-isoners in jail, unless whe e they are in custody
render or by color of the authority of the United States,
or are comitted for trial before some court of the sa, e,
or are necessary to be brought into court to testify."
I. Stat at L. , 82; U.S.R.S. Secs. 751 - 753. This act
having been passed by congress during that period when the
ide as of the American people w ere just issuing from
that stateinto which they had been thrown by the tyrannical
oppression of the mother coLntry,of believing that each
state should be as near absolute as possible and only such
powers should be granted to the naticnal government,
as were absolutely necessary to its existence;looking as
they did with suspicion uponall powers conferred upon any
person not Lider their immediate control lead to a vigorous
discussicn as to how far riJits of the national courts
should extend in enforcing theilr decrees upon the state
courts. For a time the state courts sustained their au-
thority to act even in opposition to the federal authority.
Chrishoirn v. Georgia 2 Dall.,419; Conn. v. Corbett,3 Dall.,
467. Whatever wei,;ht these cases had obtained,they
were clearly overthrown by the able argument of Qhief
4ustice Marshall in Cohens v- Virginia ( 6 Wheat.,264)
duri-g" which he said: "There are certainly nothing in
the circumstances under ahich our constitution was formed,
nothing in the history of the tires,which would justify
the opinion that the confidence reposed in the states was
so ii4liiit as to leave them and their tribunals,power of
resisting,or defeating,in the form of law,the legitimate
measures of the union." (I.,388) This decision and
others have amply maintained the view that where the
supervising authority is t'anted,by the constitutien,
and acts of congress passed pursuant thereto by the courts
of the United States,that they have the power to coerce
any state or state official which interferes with the
action of any of their officers. Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee,I Wheat,30&; Elicot v. Piersol,I Pet,328; Osborn
v. The rank, 9 Wheat,739 Thus the judiciary had accomplish-
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ed the point that the several decrees and mandates of the
national Courts were paramount over those of the state
courts w en there was a conflict. While it could not
under the judiciary act establish its authority to issuey;4 6
writo of ITabeas Corpus to inquire into the commitment of
a prisoner held in custody upon a civil or criminal process
or execution of a state court for some act done in further-
ance of the constitution,laws,and treatise of the United
States,and thus to protect the officers delo'gated to exe-
cute the decrees of the nation,nevertheless,it served to
place the -'i&-.t of the judiciary to issue the w',-it upon a
firmer foundation which vas the basis of further legislation
that has lead to the ultimate right of the U.S.Courts to
protect its officers while acting und-er the authority of
the constitution and laws of Our Union.
The inadequacy of the judiciary act was finally over-
come by the Force Bill of 1883 which provided that the
justices of the Supreme Court and Judges of the Circuit
Court shoulcdhave the additional power of granting the w'it
to prisoners in confinement when they were committed by
any authority,or law, "For any act .lene or omitted to be
done,in pursuance of a law of the United States, o'- any
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orcer,p rocess,e-' decree ,of any .r jue o.- cc,u-t thereof
nanythiug in any act of C(,i-ires-s to the '(Jont),a f,( t-
,.ithstan.-in j." . 4 Stat At ]r 632 U.S.E.S. Sac.
7b; li act wasbou-lit anout by , contomi;,ute. Irail-
ur of the ability of tlie marshalls an: tlieir eputties to
ex cute the decree* of the na: -(n durint ti.- famois Ihlli-
fication Troubls. 1,1 e tlan t,-eny years ,l'oever,-......
elapsed before this statite came u I ?or interphetatiY in
the Supr-eme Cc -t in A. "uitive slave c :- s.
W1h,1-n the iL>1;'Ltive slave lay,' ras passed and tICe mz:rshalis
were oppose', to violent opposition an-, attack by the tri-
bunals of the state, iie executing this obnoxir as i;-,
th 'l s, u jit as a protection tfl , ' vsions- of the 7th , Sc.
of the Force Bill. Tho-ju. t, t a ct was passC to prevent
certain Southern Stat s fr-om nullif, in g the acts of
Congress ,and to protect the office s in the executi(n ef 'hose
statut s from state violerce; yet it has been upheld by ti
S-r-rerem sev--al great const tuti n, -L causes as not
cnl, a proto ct ion t Revenue Officers duinj the p ain,"
di icult i_ s ,'t as a permanent statuate and one extending
to all off cers unlawfull<: detai,-d oy state a ithorit. t
This point came up for decision in the U.S.C:>rcuit
for the Easter Tistrict of Penn.,in Ex Part Jem- ans (_3 '.7all
J,-. O~ ;S.8- ' h ,'i l, v Ie, (;. I 4.) whe e c t I n ML:r-
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shalls had been arrested for an assault and battery comnit-
ted while seeking to arrest a fugitive slave,and they had
sued out a writ of Pabeas Corpus to the Circuit Coutt.
It was forcibly argued that the marshallAnot be -Iischarged
under the previsions of the Judiciary Act,but justice Grier
dischargea them undce the provisions of the seven secti(ns
of the Force Bill. The marshalls were agin arrested
by Thomas the fugitive slaveupon a cap-as for the same
offence,and they were again broujht up on a writ of Habeas
Corpus and discharged by Judge Kan, • 2 Wall. Jr. ,531.
Thereupon,they were arrested a third time by a bench warrant
issued by the county court, under an indictment found by
the gran,1 jury for assault with an intent to :-ill,based
on the same facts,and they were liberated a third time by
judge Kane,who vigorously denied the doctrine uLrged by
certain state rights men,that no authority had been given
to the judges of the vircuit court by an act of congrXess,
to JischarUPe a marshall held for a crime comnitted within
a state while in the lawful exercise of his duty.
Passing over the similar case of U.S ex Rel. v. Morris,
(2 Am. 1.Reg. O.S.,348),we come to the case of Thomas v.
Crossin ( 3 Am. Reg. 207),which was the hearing in the Penn
Sup. Ot.,of a motion for an attachment a,-ainst the sheriff
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for failure to brinC in the bodies of the deputy marshalls,
distharged by the United States Courts in the Jenkins Cases,
(Supra); and in which Judge Lewis uttered a vijorous
'lissent to this Iecision on the ground that the Force Bill
could not by any method of construing Siatutes,be extended
beyon' the limits for Which it was intended by congress,
and therefore could only be extended to a case where a
state hadL refused to obey an act of congress. This has
been the only dissenting voice to the construction which
the Circuit Qourt put upon this provision of the Force 3ill.
Whatever favor this opinion obtained among the ardent ad-
vocates of State Rights,it has been completely overcome by
the later decisions of the Supreme Court. Abelman v. Booth,
and U.S. v. Booth,21 How. 506; U.S.v. Tarble,I3 Wall.
397; Ex Parte Seibaold, 100 U.S.,37I; Tenn. v. Davis,Id. 2b'7;
Robb v. Connolly,III U.S.,624; Ex Parte Royal,II7 U.S.,
241.
The Booth cases Supra arose under the fugitive slave
law of 1850. Booth had been arrested by ABelman,a United
Statas Marshall,unde-' a proper warrant for aiding and
abetting a fugitive slave to escape,and had sued out a writ
of Habeas Corpus from the State Court,and was discharged
on the ground that the fugitive slave law was unconsti-
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tutional. Abelman thereupon sued out a writ of error
to the United States Supreme Court and it was sustained
on the ground that if the Judicial authority passed upon
the actos of congress had been reserved to the states,
then no offence against the laws and c(nstitution,of the
United States could be punished without the consent of the
state courts,and,therefore,no protection was in fact gi'ven
for any act done under them.. This issue was met by
ChiefJustice Taney as it had been earlier met by qhieZ
4ustice Marshall and he pointed out the fact that many of
the rights of soverei nty which the states had possessed
were cedeUI tc the bgeneral government wh9n the constitution
was adopted; and that,tlnrefore,as to those things the
naticnal power should be supreme,and"strong enough to ex-
ecute its own laws,by its own tribunals,without interruption
from a state or state authorities."
The case of Tenn. v. Davis, Supra,is one of the most
interesting cases decided upon the -question ofthe rio-it
ofthe United States Courts to grant the writ of 4abea;
Corpus. Davis had been indict-d in the state court for
riurder,and,before his trial,was permittcd to remove the
proceedings to the circuit cou-ton the ground that he ha-Ld
connitted no crime,but had simply been acting in self de-
-21-
fence while in the perfoinance of his duty as an internal
revenue collector. U.S.R.S.,Sec,643. The motion
of the state C'ourt to reman d was denied and an able opinion
Oy Justice Strong,in which he held that the judicial pov'ier
of the nation as set forth in the constitution ( Art. ird. Sco
2) " embraces alike civil and criminal cas ,s ariling under
the constitution and its laws; "and maintaining the rijht
of the national tribunals to execute the laws of -he Union
in opposition to the laws of the state in the following
terms: "The United States is a tovernment with authority
extending over the whole territory ofthe Union,acting upon
states and people of the state . While it is limited in
the number ol' its powe-s,so far as its sovereignt extends
it is supreme. No state government can exclude it from
the exercise of any authoity conferred upen it by the
constitution,obstruct its authorizei officers against
its will,or withhold frcm it,for a moment the cognizance
of any statute which that instrument has committed to it."
(Id. 263) Affirmed in Davis V. S. Carolina,I07 U.S.,
597•
Thus the rig'ht of the National Tribunals to discharge
their pfficers held in custofy by the state courts,
or an act comnitted under their authority and in obedience to
- 22-
the constitution and the laws of the UnitedStat es having
been settled; it remain(d for the congress to take but one
step farther and extend this power to the 5rantin.; of writs
of Habeas Corpus" In all cases where any person may be
restrained of his or her lib;rty,in violation of the ccn-
stitutien,or of any treaty,or law of the United States."
Which wastaken by Congress Feb. 5th,I867,and with the re-
vision of the statutes in I870,the power to -rant the writ
of jabeas corpus vras complete.
Two ner, questions have arisen in the later decisions
as to whether the pew er of the federal courts to issue the
writ of 4jabeas Corpus is discretionery or not; and whether
the judges thereof can exercise that riLit and discharge
a person hel:, in custody under state authority before his
cause has been I art! in the state tribunal,and thus a
single judge be enabled to pass upon the facts involved and
discharge the prisoner without a jury trial. Ample
authority has answere- these questions in the a firmative,
and has sustainedthe right of the national courts to issue
the writ at any time,either before or after trial in
a state court. or they may refuse to 1o so at their dis-
cretion. Robb v. Connol'ly,III U . S. ,624; Ex Parte
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Rdal,117 U.S. 241; Ex Parte Bridges,2 Woods 498; LIx Parto
Fonda,I7 U.S.5I6; Ex Parte Ianson,28 Fedr.,127.
At last in support of the propositions stated and case s
cited the Supreme Court hav',in passing upon the case which
is the subject of our remarks ,and granting to deputy Marshall
Neagle a release from confinement on a writ of T-abeas'
Corpussustained the right of any dfficer while executing
his Juty under the authority of the constitution,laws,and
treatise of the national g8overnnen,to arrest and,if need
beto kill an offender;and have upheld the doctrine that there is
a national "peace" which exten- s to every spot of Ame-ican
territory. Cunningham v. Neagledeci.Led April I4th,I890. 40
A. L.J.,367. The great right of liberty which 4as always
been dominant in the Anglo-Saxon race,has thus found a
firm basis; and may we hope that the national judiciary
now just started on the senond great era of its existence
ray maintain its present position, and never again allow
that firm foundation to be shaken.

